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R´ esum´ e
Cet article ´ etudie l’ensemble des ´ equilibres que l’on peut atteindre en ajoutant
des syst` emes de communication g´ en´ eraux ` a des jeux bay´ esiens dans lesquels certaines
informations peuvent ˆ etre certiﬁ´ ees ou, de fa¸ con ´ equivalente, dans lesquels les types
des joueurs sont partiellement v´ eriﬁables. Le caract` ere certiﬁable de l’information est
formalis´ e par le fait que chaque joueur dispose d’un ensemble de messages d´ ependant
de l’´ etat de la nature. ´ Etant donn´ e un tel ensemble de messages, nous caract´ erisons
des ´ equilibres canoniques auxquels s’appliquent des versions g´ en´ eralis´ ees du principe
de r´ ev´ elation. Les ´ equilibres en communication et leurs repr´ esentations canoniques
correspondent au cas particulier o` u aucune information ne peut ˆ etre certiﬁ´ ee.1 Introduction
Since the pioneering work of Aumann (1974) on correlated equilibria and Crawford
and Sobel’s (1982) analysis of cheap talk games, the introduction of communication
possibilities into the analysis of interactive decision situations has been commonplace
in a whole host of applied and theoretical researches (for some recent references, see,
e.g., Aumann and Hart, 2003, Baliga and Morris, 2002, Ben-Porath, 2003, Gerardi,
2003, Krishna and Morgan, 2002, and Urbano and Vila, 2002). Such analyses are
motivated by the fact that when individuals can talk to each other before choosing
their ﬁnal payoﬀ-relevant actions, they may be able to share information and/or
agree on compromises, and then reach outcomes that diﬀer from those of the stan-
dard Nash equilibrium solution concept. For example, a correlated equilibrium of a
strategic form game is a Nash equilibrium of some extension of the game where play-
ers receive private, “extraneous” and possibly correlated signals before the beginning
of the original game. Such a solution concept is appropriate to characterize the set
of all equilibrium outcomes achievable in one-shot complete information games with
costless and non-binding communication.
With the exception of some speciﬁc applications discussed below, the literature
on communication games and the various extensions of the correlated equilibrium
to incomplete information typically relied on the assumption that the set of reports
available to a player does not depend on his private information.1 On the contrary,
our starting point in this paper is to allow the set of all possible messages that an
individual is able to send to vary with his actual state of knowledge. Said diﬀer-
ently, the information that is transmitted might be certiﬁable or provable by its
sender, or veriﬁable by its receiver.2 For example, reports may consist of written
documents or direct physical observations which may not be forged.3 Alternatively,
in economic or legal interactions there may be penalties for perjury, false advertis-
ing and warranty violations, or accounting principles that impose limits on what is
possible to disclose. Requiring traders in an exchange economy to deposit collateral
for each order (as, e.g., in Forges, Mertens, and Vohra, 2002) also implies that their
types are partially veriﬁable because traders are not able to over-report their initial
endowments.4 Finally, an individual’s ability to manipulate and misrepresent infor-
mation may be limited due to psychological reasons (e.g., observable emotions such
as blushing, or a strong taste for honesty that cannot adequately be represented by
standard preferences, as in Alger and Ma, 2003, and Alger and Renault, 2002). The
purpose of this paper is precisely to study in a general and tractable framework the
1For an overview, see, e.g., Farrell and Rabin (1996), and Myerson (1994).
2In this paper, the terms “certiﬁable”, “provable” and “veriﬁable” are equivalent. See subsec-
tion 3.1 for a formal deﬁnition.
3For instance, disclosures of knowledge generated by R&D may be knowledge-dependent in the
sense that an informed ﬁrm cannot disclose more knowledge than it has (see, e.g., d’Aspremont,
Bhattacharya, and G´ erard-Varet, 2000).
4Similarly, the type of a budget-constrained buyer may be partially veriﬁable if the seller can
ask him to post a bond equal to his reported budget (as, e.g., in Che and Gale, 2000).
1eﬀects of adding communication systems to incomplete information games in which
players’ types are partially veriﬁable, and to provide a canonical representation of
the equilibria of such extended communication games.
Our basic model is an n-person Bayesian game. As in Forges (1990), we extend
the game by allowing the players to communicate for several periods, with the help
of a mediator, before they make their decisions. More precisely, at every stage of
the extended game, every player sends an input to a communication device, which
selects a private output for every player, as a function of past inputs and outputs. In
a standard communication equilibrium, all types of a given player have access to the
same inputs, which are thus interpreted as cheap talk. Here, we assume that, in addi-
tion to these messages, each player can also transmit reports from a type-dependent
set, i.e., can send certiﬁed information into the communication system. We deﬁne a
certiﬁcation equilibrium as a Nash equilibrium of such an extension of the Bayesian
game. Our ﬁrst result (Theorem 1) is a characterization of all certiﬁcation equi-
librium outcomes that can be achieved for given sets of type-dependent reports for
every player. We ﬁrst show that the type-dependent report sets can be represented
in a canonical way, in terms of the fundamentals of the game (we will refer to this
representation as to a certiﬁability conﬁguration). Once such a certiﬁability conﬁgu-
ration is well-deﬁned, the canonical representation we propose is simple: players are
only required to present, in a one-stage game, the most informative certiﬁcate con-
cerning their type to a mediator and to make a cheap talk claim about their type.
Then, once the mediator has received a report in this canonical space from each
player he makes private recommendations to the players. We show that there is no
loss of generality in focusing on such representations and on equilibria where players
reveal their true type and follow the recommendations of the mediator. This result
can be interpreted as the generalized revelation principle for Bayesian games with
partially veriﬁable types. The associated canonical representation (resp., canonical
equilibrium) is the analog of a direct mechanism (resp., direct incentive-compatible
mechanism) used in the mechanism design literature.
If the original set of possible communication systems is restrained to one-period
communication systems where players can only present one veriﬁable argument, we
also provide (in Theorem 2) a suﬃcient condition on the certiﬁability conﬁguration
which maintains the outcome equivalence between the associated certiﬁcation equi-
libria and canonical certiﬁcation equilibria. Finally, Theorem 3 is even closer to the
traditional revelation principle than the previous results. It states that every certiﬁ-
cation equilibrium outcome can be achieved as a truthful and obedient equilibrium
of a one-stage communication extension of the game in which the set of reports of
every player is just a subset of his original set of types. In this scenario, it is implic-
itly assumed that players must produce a certiﬁcate that is consistent with the type
they report. By contrast to Theorems 1 and 2, Theorem 3 does not describe a full
equivalence. Its converse holds under further assumptions, which guarantee that the
mediator can restrain the set of reports available in the communication system.
2Our approach combines three areas of research. As made clear above, the ﬁrst
relates to the notion of communication equilibrium (Forges, 1986; Myerson, 1982,
1986). The second area of research related to our work is the economic literature
dealing with strategic information revelation, initiated by Grossman (1981), Gross-
man and Hart (1980) and Milgrom (1981), which investigates the amount of informa-
tion voluntarily transmitted when individuals are required to make only truthful—
but possibly very vague—disclosures.5 This literature includes speciﬁc applications
in oligopoly theory (see, e.g., Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura, 1990),
ﬁnance (see, e.g., Shin, 2003), and law (see, e.g., Shin, 1994). The accounting lit-
erature has also placed considerable emphasis on games with strategic information
revelation (see, e.g., Verrecchia, 2001 and references therein). Contrary to those
previous contributions we consider a general game-theoretical framework allowing
private, stochastic, repeated, and mediated information revelation, and we do not
require players’ types to be independent. Finally, our work is related to the literature
on mechanism design with partially veriﬁable information (Bull and Watson, 2002,
Deneckere and Severinov, 2001, Green and Laﬀont, 1986). This literature, which
is restricted to the implementation of an exogenous social choice function, studies
the validity of the standard revelation principle when the set of available reports of
a single informed agent (or several symmetrically informed agents) varies with the
true state of the world.
Green and Laﬀont (1986) pointed out that the revelation principle might fail
in this framework, and proposed the ‘nested range condition’ as a necessary and
suﬃcient condition on the report sets for a form of the revelation principle to hold.
It was implicit in their approach that the agent could only send a single message,
typically consisting of a type. Deneckere and Severinov (2001) showed that the
revelation principle could be restored by enlarging the agent’s set of possible reports.
Both papers focus on message spaces that are closely related to the original state
spaces, i.e., on direct mechanisms so that the point of the revelation principle is
truthful implementation. The diﬀerence between this paper and those contributions
is that our revelation principle applies to n-person games, in which the players have
asymmetric information and must make decisions. Furthermore, instead of starting
with some desirable outcome function and looking for the means to implement it
as an equilibrium outcome, we are rather interested in characterizing all (possibly
mixed) equilibrium outcomes that are feasible when general means of communication
(i.e., mediators with perfect recall, equipped with lotteries, for several periods) are
available to the players. In particular, the sets of (type-dependent as well as type-
independent) inputs and the sets of outputs of non-canonical communication systems
are fully arbitrary, their elements have no pre-determined semantic meaning. This is
the reason why we insist in establishing full equivalence results, stating not only that
all equilibrium outcomes can be achieved as canonical ones but also that the set of
5For more recent references, see, e.g., Glazer and Rubinstein (2001), Koessler (2002, 2003),
Lipman and Seppi (1995), Seidmann and Winter (1997), and Wolinsky (2003).
3canonical outcomes is not too large, i.e., that all canonical outcomes are compatible
with the original certiﬁcation possibilities. In this way, our representations can be
used without loss of generality to maximize any function of the players’ payoﬀs.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present our general framework
and some preliminary deﬁnitions. Canonical representations and generalized versions
of the revelation principle for Bayesian games are analyzed in Section 3. We conclude
in Section 4. The Appendix contains the proofs.
2 General Framework and Deﬁnitions
2.1 Bayesian Games and Communication Systems
We represent an interactive decision situation under asymmetric information by a
(ﬁnite) Bayesian game
G = hN;(Ai)i2N;(Ti)i2N;p;(ui)i2Ni;
where N = f1;:::;ng is the set of players, Ai is player i’s set of possible actions, Ti is
player i’s set of possible types, p 2 ∆(T) is a common prior probability distribution
over the set of type proﬁles T =
Q
i2N Ti, and ui : A £ T ! R is player i’s state
dependent payoﬀ (utility) function, where A =
Q
i2N Ai is the set of action proﬁles.
Let p(ti) ´
P
t¡i2T¡i p(ti;t¡i) be the prior probability that player i’s type is ti.6
We assume without loss of generality that p(ti) > 0 for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti. Let
p(t¡i j ti) ´
p(t)
p(ti) be the subjective probability that player i assigns to the event that
t¡i is the actual proﬁle of the other players’ types if his own type is ti.7
To allow players to communicate before choosing an action in the Bayesian game
G, we introduce a communication system (or mediator) that helps players to share
information and to coordinate their actions.8 As usual, in a game with communi-
cation players exchange messages conditionally on past messages and on their own
type before choosing their actions. However, contrary to previous work related to
cheap talk communication and to the various extensions of the correlated equilib-
rium to incomplete information, we assume that the set of available messages may
be type-dependent. As a consequence, reports may have some pure informational
content which does not depend on any particular equilibrium and players may be
able to certify some of their information.
Formally, a (ﬁnite) communication system given the set of players, N, and the
set of possible type proﬁles, T, is denoted by
c = h(Ri)i2N;(Si)i2N;(Mi)i2N;K;(ºk)k=0;1;:::;Ki:
6For any variable, we denote its proﬁle over all agents except that of player i by the corresponding
letter with subscript ¡i.
7We do not assume that every type proﬁle has non-zero probability.
8Players have no ability to sign any contract or binding agreement. Hence, our approach is
strictly non-cooperative.
4The positive integer K is the number of communication periods. For each player i,
Ri : Ti ! Ri is a reporting correspondence that determines the set Ri(ti) of type-
dependent inputs available to player i of type ti 2 Ti, i.e., the set of reports that
player i can send out into the communication system in each period if his actual
type is ti, and Ri ´
S
ti2Ti Ri(ti) is the set of all reports the communication system
can receive from player i in each period. The set Si is the set of type-independent
inputs available to player i, i.e., the set of cheap talk signals that player i can send
out into the communication system in each period. The set Mi is the set of outputs
for player i, i.e., the set of all messages that player i can privately receive from
the communication system in each period. Let R =
Q





i2N Mi. (Observe that, a priori, the elements of R, S and M have no semantic
content.) In period 0, each player i privately receives from the communication
system an initial output m0
i 2 Mi, where m0 = (m0
i)i2N is distributed according to
the probability distribution º0 2 ∆(M). Then, at the end of each communication
period k 2 f1;:::;Kg, after all inputs up to that period have been received by the
communication system, the transition probability
ºk : Mk £ Rk £ Sk ! ∆(M);
chooses the outputs as a function of past outputs and past and present inputs.
That is, º(mk j m0;m1;:::;mk¡1;r1;:::;rk;s1;:::;sk) is the conditional proba-
bility that mk = (mk
1;:::;mk
n) 2 M are the messages privately received by the
various players at the end of period k given the sequence of vectors of past outputs
(m0;m1;:::;mk¡1) 2 Mk, past and present type-dependent inputs (r1;:::;rk) 2
Rk, and past and present type-independent inputs (s1;:::;sk) 2 Sk.
2.2 Extended Bayesian Games and Certiﬁcation Equilibria
Given a communication system c, one can deﬁne the extension Gc of G as the new
game obtained by adding c to G. Such a communication game proceeds as follows. In
period 0, after having received the output m0
i, player i is privately informed about his
type ti 2 Ti, where t = (ti)i2N is distributed according to p. Then, at the beginning
of each period k 2 f1;:::;Kg he sends a conﬁdential input (rk
i ;sk
i ) 2 Ri(ti) £ Si to
the communication system. At the end of each period k 2 f1;:::;Kg, he receives a
conﬁdential output mk
i 2 Mi from the communication system. Finally, after the last
communication period (in period K + 1, which corresponds to the action phase) he
chooses an action ai 2 Ai and is rewarded according to his utility function ui.
A behavioral strategy for player i in Gc is a tuple ((¾k






i £ Ti ! ∆(Ri £ Si);
is player i’s communication strategy in period k satisfying ¾k
i (rk
i ;sk
i j ¢;ti) = 0
5whenever rk




i £ Ti ! ∆(Ai);
is player i’s strategy in the action phase. A proﬁle of behavioral strategies is de-
noted by (¾;±) = (¾i;±i)i2N, where ¾i = (¾k
i )k=1;:::;K. Such a strategy proﬁle in Gc





t)ui(a;t) for each player i.9 As usual, a (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of the commu-
nication game Gc is a strategy proﬁle (¾;±) such that no player can strictly increase
his expected payoﬀ by unilaterally deviating from his strategy. The outcome gener-
ated by a Nash equilibrium of Gc is called an equilibrium outcome of Gc.10
Deﬁnition 1 A certiﬁcation equilibrium of G is a Nash equilibrium of the extended
game Gc obtained by adding a communication system c to G.11
It can be shown12 that the set of all certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes, denoted
by E µ [∆(A)]
T, obtained when considering all possible communication systems (in
particular, all possible reporting correspondences), coincides with the set of Nash
equilibrium outcomes of the extended games obtained by adding a one-period com-
munication system (K = 1) without initial output (º0 is degenerate), without type-
independent input (S is a singleton), satisfying M = A, Ri(ti) = ftig for all i 2 N
and ti 2 Ti, and in which every player follows the recommendation of the mediator.
That is, a certiﬁcation equilibrium outcome is simply characterized by a recommen-













for all i 2 N, ti 2 Ti, and di : Ai ! Ai. The intuition of this equivalent characteri-
zation is very simple. Starting with any certiﬁcation equilibrium, the mediator ﬁrst
simulates the sequence of signals and reports (inputs) that would have been sent by
the players and the sequence of messages (outputs) that would have been received by
the players given the type proﬁle under the original equilibrium. Then, he computes
the actions that would have been chosen by the players as a function of the type
proﬁle and the sequence of inputs and outputs. Finally, he privately recommends
9That is, if for all (m;r;s) 2 M
K £ R
K £ S





K generated by (¾;±) in Gc given m
0 2 M and t 2 T, then






(m;r;s)2MK£RK£SK h(m;r;s j m
0;t)±(a j m
0;m;r;s;t).
10We consider equilibrium outcomes rather than equilibrium strategies because the dimension of
strategy sets depends on the underlying communication system. By contrast, equilibrium outcomes
are always in [∆(A)]
T.
11We use the term “certiﬁcation equilibrium” to point out the link with a communication equi-
librium, which is deﬁned as a certiﬁcation equilibrium except that the communication systems used
to deﬁne a communication equilibrium do not allow players to certify their information through
type-dependent sets of available inputs (see Deﬁnition 2).
12The formal proof is a simpliﬁed version of the Proof of Theorem 1.
6each player to choose the associated action. Clearly, if a player has an incentive to
deviate from the recommendation of the mediator, then the strategy proﬁle of the
original communication game was not an equilibrium.
The previous observation can be interpreted as a form of “revelation principle”:
any certiﬁcation equilibrium is outcome equivalent to a “truthful certiﬁcation equi-
librium”. However, the set of “truthful certiﬁcation equilibria” generated in this
way is much too large for the result to be interesting, and is not appropriate for
most applications. Indeed, players may have the right to remain silent or to present
only vague arguments, whereas in some certiﬁcation equilibria they are compelled to
reveal their type to the mediator even if they have no incentive to do so. A simple
illustration is provided in Example 1. On the other hand, in some environments
players may have only limited ability to certify claims. Accordingly, when certiﬁ-
ability possibilities are given and only partial, it is not appropriate to consider a
communication system with Ri(ti) = ftig for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti because what is
certiﬁed with such a communication system might not be certiﬁable with the original
set of available reports.
For those reasons we deﬁne certiﬁcation equilibria that can be obtained only
with a speciﬁed proﬁle of available type-dependent inputs, i.e., with communica-
tion systems where the reporting correspondences R = (Ri)i2N are given. Such
communication systems are called R–communication systems. If the set of available
inputs does not depend on players’ types then the set of associated equilibria is, by
deﬁnition, the set of communication equilibria.
Deﬁnition 2 An R–certiﬁcation equilibrium of G is a Nash equilibrium of the ex-
tended game Gc obtained by adding an R–communication system c to G. A com-
munication equilibrium is an R–certiﬁcation equilibrium where Ri(ti) = Ri(t0
i) for
all ti, t0
i 2 Ti and i 2 N.
We denote by E(R) the set of R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes and by E0
the set of communication equilibrium outcomes. Clearly, we have E0 µ E(R) µ E for
every proﬁle of reporting correspondences R, and all these sets are convex (thanks
to the preliminary lottery º0). As shown in the following example these inclusions
may be strict.
Example 1 Consider a consumer whose endowments depend on two equally likely
types, t1 and t2, which are private information to the consumer. There are two com-
modities. In state t1 (t2, resp.) the consumer’s endowment is (10;0) ((0;10), resp.).
A government can choose to deduct taxes of twenty per cent either on commodity 1
(action a1) or on commodity 2 (action a2). If each unit of commodity provides a util-
ity of one to the consumer and to the government, this situation can be represented
by the Bayesian game of Figure 1 on the next page. In this game it can be shown13
that the set of communication equilibrium outcomes and the set of R–certiﬁcation
13See Section 3 for a general and explicit characterization.
7equilibrium outcomes coincide whenever player 1 can remain silent, i.e., whenever
T
t2T R1(t) 6= ;: they are characterized by ¹(a2 j t2) = 1 ¡ ¹(a1 j t1). Hence, the
only associated vector of expected payoﬀs is (9;1). The set of all certiﬁcation equi-
librium outcomes is however strictly larger since it is the set of outcomes satisfying
¹(a2 j t2) ¸ 1 ¡ ¹(a1 j t1). In particular, the perfectly revealing recommendation




Figure 1: Bayesian Game of Example 1.
In the following section we introduce canonical communication systems and equi-
libria given some speciﬁed proﬁle of reporting correspondences R = (Ri)i2N in order
to obtain a simple and equivalent characterization of the set of all R–certiﬁcation
equilibrium outcomes.
3 Canonical Representations
3.1 Certiﬁability Conﬁguration and Canonical Communication Sys-
tems
As noted earlier, the inputs in a communication system have no semantic content.
In order to capture certiﬁcation possibilities associated with a proﬁle of reporting
correspondences in a canonical way, we ﬁrst introduce a framework where certiﬁable
information is represented as events of the state space. Then, we prove a generalized
version of the revelation principle for Bayesian games with type-dependent sets of
available signals in order to characterize the set of all R–certiﬁcation equilibrium
outcomes in a tractable way. This is performed by deﬁning appropriate canonical
communication systems where the proﬁle of reporting correspondences is written as
a certiﬁability conﬁguration.
A certiﬁability conﬁguration is an n-tuple of collections of sets of types, Y =
(Yi)i2N, where an element yi 2 Yi µ 2Tinf;g is a certiﬁcate (certiﬁable event)
concerning player i’s type. For all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti we assume that there exists
yi 2 Yi such that ti 2 yi.14 The set of events that player i of type ti is able to
certify concerning his type is the set of certiﬁcates containing ti and is denoted by
Yi(ti) ´ fyi 2 Yi : ti 2 yig. Hence, a certiﬁability conﬁguration Y = (Yi)i2N can
equivalently be viewed as a proﬁle of reporting correspondences R = Y = (Yi)i2N.
The closure of a certiﬁability conﬁguration Y is the certiﬁability conﬁguration Y =
14The set Yi is not assumed to be closed under intersection, union or complementation, even if
the closure under intersection often seems natural as will be discussed later.
8(Y i)i2N where for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti, Y i(ti) is the element of Yi containing ti,
and Yi is the smallest set containing Yi which is closed under intersection. Deﬁne
the smallest event concerning player i’s type as MiniYi(ti) ´
T
yi2Yi(ti) yi and let
MiniY (t) = (MiniYi(ti))i2N.
Let R = (Ri)i2N be an arbitrary proﬁle of reporting correspondences. With any
such proﬁle we can associate a unique certiﬁability conﬁguration Y R = (Y R
i )i2N,
where Y R
i (ti) ´ fR¡1
i (ri) : ri 2 Ri(ti)g for all ti 2 Ti, i 2 N, and R¡1
i (ri) ´
fti 2 Ti : ri 2 Ri(ti)g is the set of types of player i who can send the report ri.
Hence, YR
i ´ fY R
i (ti) : ti 2 Tig = fR¡1
i (ri) : ri 2 Rig for all i 2 N. It is worth
mentioning that many diﬀerent proﬁles of reporting correspondences can generate
the same certiﬁability conﬁguration.
Given a certiﬁability conﬁguration Y and its closure Y , we deﬁne a canonical
Y –communication system as a Y –communication system such that S = T, M = A,
K = 1, and º0 is degenerate. Hence, in a canonical Y –communication system
there is no initial output, there is only one communication period, a report of each
player i 2 N of type ti 2 Ti is a certiﬁcate concerning his type, yi 2 Y i(ti), a cheap
talk signal is a claim about his type, si 2 Ti, and messages sent by the communication
system are (recommended) actions.
3.2 Canonical Certiﬁcation Equilibria
Deﬁnition 3 A canonical Y –certiﬁcation equilibrium of G is a Nash equilibrium
of the extended game Gc obtained by adding a canonical Y –communication system
c to G, and in which every player certiﬁes the smallest event concerning his type,
truthfully reveals his type, and follows the recommendation of the mediator.
In other words, in a canonical Y –certiﬁcation equilibrium each type ti 2 Ti of
every player i 2 N sends the report MiniYi(ti), sends the cheap talk signal ti, and
plays the action recommended by the mediator. Hence, such an equilibrium outcome
















for all i 2 N, ti, t0
i 2 Ti, yi 2 Y i(ti), and di : Ai ! Ai. The set of canoni-
cal Y –certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes is denoted by E¤(Y ). According to the
following theorem, for any proﬁle of reporting correspondences R = (Ri)i2N, the
set E¤(Y
R), where Y
R is the closure of the certiﬁability conﬁguration generated
by R, exactly coincides with the set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes achievable
through all R–communication systems. The intuition of this result is similar to
the revelation principle for Bayesian games with non-certiﬁable information, except
9that, in the latter case, without any speciﬁc assumption, communication equilibria
which use several communication periods can be equivalently achieved as one-stage
canonical communication equilibria (see Forges, 1990). Here, we have to take the
closure Y
R of the certiﬁability conﬁguration Y R generated by the reporting corre-
spondences R to ensure that every information which can be certiﬁed by sending
diﬀerent reports at diﬀerent periods in the original equilibrium can also be certiﬁed
in the one-period canonical communication system. Deneckere and Severinov (2001)
already recognized the crucial role of multiple reports in extending the revelation
principle to principal-agent problems with partially veriﬁable types. Given a basic
state space, they construct a large set of messages, which typically capture multiple
claims about the agent’s private information. Assuming the existence of a state inde-
pendent “worst outcome”, they show that any implementable social choice function,
deﬁned on the large set of messages, is truthfully implementable. Theorem 1 below
diﬀers from this result in several respects. First, it applies to any n-person Bayesian
game, without any requirement of possible “worst outcomes”. Furthermore, in an
R–certiﬁcation equilibrium, the range of the reporting correspondences, the input
sets and the output sets have no relationship with the fundamentals of the game.
We thus derive appropriate direct mechanisms before exhibiting truthful equilibria.
Theorem 1 The set of R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set
of canonical Y
R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes. That is, E(R) = E¤(Y
R) for all
proﬁles of reporting correspondences R.
The following example illustrates the canonical representation. A similar, but not
quite identical (see Subsection 3.3), example was used by Green and Laﬀont (1986) to
show the possible failure of the revelation principle and by Deneckere and Severinov
(2001) to show how restore it. The example also shows that communication equilibria
can diﬀer from certiﬁcation equilibria even if we consider certiﬁability conﬁgurations
Y R allowing players to remain silent, i.e., such that Ti 2 Y R
i (ti) for all ti 2 Ti and
i 2 N.15
Example 2 Consider the game of Figure 2 on the following page, where N = f1;2g,
T2 and A1 are singleton, T1 = ft1;t2;t3g, A2 = fa1;a2g, and consider the following
reporting correspondence: R(t1) = fr;r0g and R(t2) = R(t3) = fr;r0;r00g. A naive
application of the standard revelation principle in this game leads to the conclusion
that the complete information outcome (a1 j t1;a2 j t2;a2 j t3) is not implementable
since if each type sends a diﬀerent report to the mediator, then the sender of type t1
deviates by sending the same report as type t2 or t3. Consider on the contrary the
canonical representation presented before. The certiﬁability conﬁguration generated
by R is YR = fft2;t3g;Tg (the report r00 allows to exclude the occurrence of state
t1), so Y
R = Y R, MiniY R(t1) = T and MiniY R(t2) = MiniY R(t3) = ft2;t3g. The
15Note that this condition is equivalent to
T
ti2Ti Ri(ti) 6= ; for all i 2 N. In other words, each
player can send an uninformative report (i.e., a report which is available whatever his type).
10complete information outcome can be truthfully implemented with the recommenda-
tion º¤ : YR £ T ! ∆(A) satisfying º¤(a2 j (ft2;t3g;t2)) = º¤(a2 j (ft2;t3g;t3)) = 1
and º¤(a1 j (y;t)) = 1 for all other inputs (y;t) 2 YR £ T. Of course, this outcome
is not a communication equilibrium outcome since type t1 will claim that his type





Figure 2: Bayesian Game of Example 2.
3.3 One-Period Communication Systems
In this subsection we give a suﬃcient condition on the proﬁle of reporting cor-
respondences R such that the set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes that can be
achieved with all one-period R–communication systems coincides with the set of R–
certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes. The motivation for the restriction to Bayesian
games extended with only one-period communication systems is that in some ap-
plications one may be interested by the set of equilibria that can be achieved when
players are restricted to present only one or few arguments, as it is the case, e.g., in
Glazer and Rubinstein’s (2001) analysis of debates.
Another interesting example is the conﬁguration examined by Alger and Renault
(2002). There, the informed player can be of two diﬀerent payoﬀ-relevant types, t1
and t2, and in addition he can be honest or (possibly) dishonest. The honest player
can only reveal his true payoﬀ-relevant type, whereas the dishonest player can also
lie. Denote by tl
h (tl
d, resp.) the honest player (dishonest player, resp.) whose payoﬀ-
relevant type is tl, for l = 1, 2. The reporting correspondence of the player is thus
characterized by R(t1
h) = ft1g, R(t2
h) = ft2g, and R(t1
d) = R(t2
d) = ft1;t2g. This cor-
















dgg. Consider now the game of
Figure 3 on the next page with a ﬂat prior probability distribution. It is easy to
see that there is an R–certiﬁcation equilibrium generating the outcome ¹(a1 j t1
d) =
¹(a1 j t2
d) = ¹(a2 j t1
h) = ¹(a3 j t2
h) = 1. However, this equilibrium outcome cannot
be achieved with any one-period R–communication system since one of the honest
type will always imitate the input used by one of the dishonest type. As ﬁrst pointed
out by Deneckere and Severinov (2001), once multiple communication periods are
allowed, a dishonest type can prove to be dishonest by sending two “contradicting”
reports (t1 and t2). This possibility is implicitly introduced by taking the closure
of the original certiﬁability conﬁguration, but is perhaps not satisfactory given the
psychological considerations that motivate the example. In particular, following Al-
11ger and Renault’s (2002) terminology, the “second-order honesty” conﬁguration in
which an honest player can neither imitate a dishonest player by lying about his
payoﬀ-relevant type nor by lying about his ethics becomes equivalent to the previ-
ous “ﬁrst-order honesty” conﬁguration in which an honest player is only required to
tell the truth concerning his payoﬀ-relevant type.16
a1 a2 a3
t1
d (2;1) (0;2) (1;¡2)
t1
h (2;1) (0;2) (1;¡2)
t2
d (2;1) (1;¡2) (0;2)
t2
h (2;1) (1;¡2) (0;2)
Figure 3: One-Period vs Multiple-Period Certiﬁcation Equilibria.
In the following lines we show that if each player is able to certify the intersection
of all certiﬁable events concerning his type, then considering multiple periods or only
single period communication systems is equivalent. Otherwise, as in the previous
example, we are not able to provide a simple representation of the set of one-period
certiﬁcation equilibria since diﬀerent inputs should be used to achieve diﬀerent pos-
sible outcomes, and an initial lottery is thus necessary to ensure the convexity of the
set of equilibrium outcomes.
Deﬁnition 4 A certiﬁability conﬁguration Y = (Yi)i2N, or an associated proﬁle
of reporting correspondences R such that Y R = Y , satisﬁes the Minimal Closure
Condition (MCC) if MiniYi(ti) 2 Yi(ti) for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti.
Obviously, a suﬃcient but not necessary condition for MCC to be satisﬁed is
that each collection of events Yi is closed under intersection, i.e., Y = Y . Another
suﬃcient condition for a certiﬁability conﬁguration to satisfy MCC is that it is gener-
ated by a proﬁle of reporting correspondences satisfying Green and Laﬀont’s (1986)
Nested Range Condition (NRC). More precisely, a proﬁle of reporting correspon-
dences R such that ti 2 Ri(ti) µ Ti for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti satisﬁes NRC if for
all i 2 N and ti, t0
i 2 Ti we have t0
i 2 Ri(ti) ) Ri(t0
i) µ Ri(ti). It is not diﬃcult
to prove that under NRC the generated certiﬁability conﬁguration satisﬁes MCC.
However, the converse is not true. Indeed, consider a reporting correspondence as
in Example 2: T = ft1;t2;t3g, R(t1) = ft1;t2g, R(t2) = R(t3) = T. NRC is not
satisﬁed since t2 2 R(t1) but R(t2) * R(t1). However, MCC is satisﬁed since the
16It is important to notice the diﬀerence between this example and Example 2. In Example 2 the
complete information outcome cannot be achieved by requiring that every player sends a diﬀerent
type-dependent input but it can be achieved with the original reporting correspondence as an
equilibrium in which the mediator cannot distinguish type t
2 from type t
3. On the contrary, the
outcome considered in the previous example cannot be obtained as an equilibrium with the original
reporting correspondence.
12generated set of certiﬁable events, YR = fft2;t3g;Tg, is closed under intersection.17
Theorem 2 If R satisﬁes the minimal closure condition, then the set of one-period
R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of R–certiﬁcation equi-
librium outcomes.
An immediate corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 is that under MCC the set of
all one-period R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes exactly coincides with the set
of canonical Y
R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes. It is also worth mentioning
that under MCC a canonical Y R–certiﬁcation equilibrium is well deﬁned and that
E¤(Y
R) = E¤(Y R) even if Y
R 6= Y R.
3.4 An Alternative Representation
In this subsection, following the approach of Forges et al. (2002),18 we propose an
alternative representation theorem for Bayesian games with certiﬁable information
by constructing, from any given R–communication system, an R¤–communication
system in which the set of available inputs of each type ti of every player i is restricted
to a subset R¤
i(ti) of his set of types (i.e., R¤
i(ti) µ Ti for all ti 2 Ti and i 2 N).
Such a communication system can be (uniquely) deﬁned for any R–communication
system, and the associated set of equilibrium outcomes contains all R–certiﬁcation
equilibrium outcomes. However, in general, this set does not coincide with the set
of R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes because it may contain more outcomes than
can actually be achieved with R–communication systems. Nevertheless, natural
suﬃcient conditions are provided for the equivalence to hold.
More precisely, given any proﬁle of reporting correspondences R, let R¤
i(ti) ´
fsi 2 Ti : MiniY R
i (si) 2 Y
R
i (ti)g for all ti 2 Ti and i 2 N. That is, in an R¤–
communication system the set of all type-dependent inputs that the mediator can
receive from each player is a claim concerning his type, where it is implicitly as-
sumed that when some type ti is reported by player i he also sends the associated
certiﬁcate MiniY R
i (ti). It is not diﬃcult to check that the proﬁle of correspondences
R¤ generates the certiﬁability conﬁguration e YR = ( e Yi
R
)i2N, where for all i 2 N,
e YR
i ´ fMiniY R
i (ti) : ti 2 Tig.19 Hence, from Theorem 1 we know that the set
of R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of e Y R–certiﬁcation
equilibrium outcomes. Moreover, since players have less possible deviations in a
17In Green and Laﬀont’s (1986) original example, mentioned in the previous section, neither NRC
nor MCC are satisﬁed, so that Theorem 2 does not apply.
18Forges et al. (2002) consider an exchange economy with type-dependent preferences and initial
endowments. By relying on an appropriate version of the revelation principle, they focus on mech-
anisms in which every agent is just asked to report his type, with the understanding that he has to
show the corresponding initial endowment.
19Of course, when certiﬁcation possibilities are partial, this implies that players can still lie
concerning their true type. For example, if MiniY
R
i (si) 2 e Y
R
i (ti) for si 6= ti, then type ti can
certify MiniY
R
i (si) 6= MiniY
R
i (ti). This cannot happen, however, if all types can be fully certiﬁed,
i.e., if ftig 2 Y
R
i for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti.
13(canonical) e Y R–certiﬁcation equilibrium than in a (canonical) Y
R–certiﬁcation equi-
librium, the set of R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes is included in the set of
R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes. The next theorem shows that we can even
consider one-period R¤–certiﬁcation equilibria without initial outputs and without
cheap talk signals, where every player truthfully reveals his type and follows the
recommendation of the mediator.
Theorem 3 Every R–certiﬁcation equilibrium is outcome-equivalent to a one-period
R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium in which the communication system has no initial out-
put, S is a singleton, M = A, and R¤
i(ti) ´ fsi 2 Ti : MiniY R
i (si) 2 Y
R
i (ti)g for all
i 2 N and ti 2 Ti, and in which strategies are truthful and obedient.
For example, the complete information outcome obtained in Example 2 can be
truthfully implemented with this alternative representation, which gives R¤(t1) =
ft1g and R¤(t2) = R¤(t3) = ft1;t2;t3g. In this example the modiﬁcation of the
reporting correspondence R is irrelevant since the closure of the generated certiﬁ-
ability conﬁguration is not modiﬁed (Y
R = e Y R). However, in general, the closure
of the certiﬁability conﬁguration generated by R is diﬀerent from the certiﬁability
conﬁguration generated by R¤, so the inclusion in Theorem 3 may be strict (see
Example 1).
The equivalence is restored, for example, if the mediator is able to impose a
penalty to any player whose report does not correspond to any equilibrium report,
i.e., if for all i 2 N and t¡i 2 T¡i there exists a¡i 2 A¡i such that ui(ai;a¡i;t) ·
ui(a0;t) for all ai 2 Ai, a0 2 A and ti 2 Ti. Recalling the comments in Subsection 3.2,
a¡i is a “worst outcome” in the sense of Deneckere and Severinov (2001). This as-
sumption is for instance satisﬁed in the standard mechanism design framework with
transferable utility, where there are n¡1 agents (with no decision to make) and one
uninformed player (the principal) who can make monetary transfers between agents.
Alternatively, a mechanism designer or a mediator may be able to directly restrict
the set of reporting choices of the individuals (albeit not being able to prevent them
from lying), as it is the case when positive disclosures are mandatory. Under one
of these conditions, an interesting corollary of Theorem 2 is that under MCC the
set of all one-period R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes exactly coincides with the
set of truthful and obedient one-period R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes. This
characterization may be very useful in many applications since a truthful and obe-
dient one-period R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium is simply characterized by an outcome















14for all i 2 N, ti 2 Ti, t0
i 2 R¤(ti), and di : Ai ! Ai.
Finally, it is interesting to remark that the approach proposed here allows to make
a direct link with Green and Laﬀont’s (1986) framework. Indeed, it can be checked
that a proﬁle of reporting correspondences R satisﬁes NRC if and only if R = R¤.
As a consequence, if one of the conditions discussed in the previous paragraph is
satisﬁed, then for any proﬁle R we can construct unambiguously, and without loss
of generality, another proﬁle R¤ satisfying NRC. Otherwise, in the general case, the
canonical construction of the representation theorem 1 or 2 should be used.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have characterized in a tractable way the set of all Nash equilibrium
outcomes that can be achieved in Bayesian games in which players have the ability to
voluntarily certify and exchange their information through general communication
systems. In particular, our framework and results encompass the representation
theorem for communication equilibria, as well as existing versions of the revelation
principle for principal-agent problems where the set of reports available to the agent
is type-dependent.
Since we have considered general communication systems the question of how
certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes can be implemented in an equilibrium by adding
only unmediated communication systems to the original Bayesian game was not
addressed in this paper and remains the topic of future research. In particular,
it should be interesting to investigate whether certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes
can be implemented with direct communication systems by considering a suﬃcient
number of players (as, e.g., in B´ ar´ any, 1992, Ben-Porath, 2003, Forges, 1990, and
Gerardi, 2003), by allowing codiﬁed messages and bounded computational abilities
(as in Urbano and Vila, 2002), or by considering the correlated equilibrium instead
of the Nash equilibrium as a solution concept (as in Forges, 1988). It should also
be helpful to provide a geometric characterization of the set of Nash equilibrium
outcomes achievable with direct communication and certiﬁable information in two-
player games with incomplete information on one side, as is provided by Aumann
and Hart (2003) for cheap talk communication. There, the set of communication
equilibrium outcomes gives an upper bound for the set of Nash equilibrium out-
comes achievable with unmediated communication systems when information is not
certiﬁable. The set of certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes characterized in this paper
gives exactly the analog of this upper bound in direct communication games with
partially veriﬁable types.
Appendix
To prove the theorems we introduce some lemmas and some additional notations.
Denote by E(R j K = 1) the set of one-period R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes,
15and denote by E#(R¤) the set of one-period R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcomes
in which the communication system has no initial output, S is a singleton, M = A,
and in which strategies are truthful and obedient. Let QR = (QR)i2N be the proﬁle
of correspondences deﬁned by QR
i (ti) ´ fqi 2 2Ri : qi µ Ri(ti)g for all ti 2 Ti and









i (ti), then Ri(t0
i) µ Ri(ti).
Proof. We show that Ri(t0
i) * Ri(ti) ) MiniY R
i (t0
i) = 2 Y
R
i (ti). Let ri 2 Ri(t0
i),
ri = 2 Ri(ti). We have ri 2 Ri(t0
i) ) R¡1
i (ri) 2 Y
R
i (t0




ri = 2 Ri(ti) ) ti = 2 R¡1
i (ri). Thus, ti = 2 MiniY R
i (t0





i (ti) since ti 2 yi for all yi 2 Y
R
i (ti). ¤
Lemma 2 For every proﬁle of reporting correspondences R, E¤(Y
R) µ E(R). If R
satisﬁes MCC, then E¤(Y
R) µ E(R j K = 1).
Proof. Let º¤ : Y
R £ T ! ∆(A) be any canonical Y
R–certiﬁcation equilibrium.
We construct an outcome-equivalent R–certiﬁcation equilibrium as follows. Let c be
an R–communication system satisfying M = A, S = T, K > jRi(ti)j for all i 2 N
and ti 2 Ti, ºk is degenerate for k = 0;1;:::;K ¡ 1. In addition, ºK only depends
on the sequence of reporting proﬁles r = (r1;:::;rK) 2 RK and on the cheap talk
signals sent in the last communication period (period K), sK = (sK
1 ;:::;sK


















i (ri) = MiniY R
i (ti) for all i 2 N, the strategy which consists for each
type ti of every player i in sending every report in Ri(ti) during the communication
phase, revealing his true type in the last communication period and following the
recommendation of the mediator is, by the deﬁnition of the original canonical Y
R–
certiﬁcation equilibrium and the construction of c, a Nash equilibrium of Gc. This
equilibrium is clearly outcome-equivalent to º¤. Similarly, to prove the second part
of the lemma let º(m;r;s) = º¤([R¡1
i (ri)]i2N;s) for all (m;r;s) 2 M £ R £ T and
remark that under MCC, for all i 2 N and ti 2 Ti, there exists ri 2 Ri(ti) such that
R¡1
i (ri) = MiniY R
i (ti). ¤
Lemma 3 For every proﬁle of reporting correspondences R, E(R) µ E(QR j K = 1).
Proof. Consider any Nash equilibrium of any communication game Gc where c
is an R–communication system. We construct an outcome-equivalent one-period Q–
certiﬁcation equilibrium where Q = QR, M = A, the initial lottery is degenerate, the
16transition probability is ¼ : (
Q
i2N 2Ri)£T ! ∆(A), each player i of type ti follows
the recommendation generated by ¼, sends the report Ri(ti) 2 Q(ti) and reveals his
true type. That is, ¾i(ti) = (Ri(ti);ti) and ±i(ai j ai;ri;si;ti) = 1 for all ti 2 Ti,
ai 2 Ai, (ri;si) 2 Qi(ti) £ Ti and i 2 N. If every player i sends an input (Ri(si);si)
for some si 2 Ti, then ¼ simulates the action proﬁle played in the original equilibrium
when the type proﬁle is s = (s1;:::;sn) 2 T. Clearly, this constructed mechanism
generates the original equilibrium outcome. To verify that it is incentive compatible
we must verify that for every player i, no type ti has an incentive to deviate from
(Ri(ti);ti) to (qi;si) 6= (Ri(ti);ti) for all (qi;si) 2 Qi(ti)£Ti. If (qi;si) = (Ri(si);si)
(unobservable deviation), then Ri(si) µ Ri(ti) (because Ri(si) 2 Qi(ti) ) Ri(si) µ
Ri(ti)), which means that type ti already had the possibility to imitate type si’s
communication strategy under the original equilibrium. If (qi;si) 6= (Ri(si);si)
(observable deviation), then ¼ simulates the outcome generated by a deviation of
player i to, e.g., an unconditional sequence of K reports of any single report in qi
and K cheap talk signals in Si under the original equilibrium. This deviation was
already available to type ti since qi 2 Qi(ti) ) qi µ Ri(ti). ¤
Lemma 4 For every proﬁle of reporting correspondences R, E(R j K = 1) µ
E¤(Y
R).
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3. Consider any Nash equi-
librium of any communication game Gc where c is a one-period R–communication
system. We construct an outcome-equivalent canonical Y –certiﬁcation equilibrium
º¤ : Y £ T ! ∆(A), where Y = Y
R, as follows. If every player i sends an input
(MiniYi(si);si) for some si 2 Ti, then º¤ simulates the action proﬁle played in the
original equilibrium when the type proﬁle is s 2 T. If some player i sends an input
(yi;si) 6= (MiniYi(si);si), then º¤ simulates the outcome generated by player i’s
deviation to some report ri such that yi µ R¡1
i (ri) and some cheap talk signal in
Si under the original equilibrium. This deviation was already available to type ti
since yi 2 Y i(ti) ) ti 2 yi µ R¡1
i (ri) ) ri 2 Ri(ti). It remains to show that type
ti has no incentive to send an input (MiniYi(si);si) for si 6= ti. This is obtained
by Lemma 1 since MiniYi(si) 2 Yi(ti), so Ri(si) µ Ri(ti), which means that an
equivalent deviation was already available under the original equilibrium. ¤




Therefore, by Lemmas 2 and 3 we get E(QR j K = 1) µ E¤(Y
R) µ E(R) µ E(QR j
K = 1), so E¤(Y
R) = E(R). ¤
Lemma 5 For every proﬁle of reporting correspondences R, E#(R¤) = E¤(e Y R).
Proof. Clearly, we have E#(R¤) µ E(R¤). In addition, Theorem 1 gives
E(R¤) = E¤(e Y R) because the proﬁle of reporting correspondences R¤ generates the
certiﬁability conﬁguration e Y R. Thus, we have to show that E¤(e Y R) µ E#(R¤). Let
17º¤ : e YR£T ! ∆(A) be any canonical e Y R–certiﬁcation equilibrium. We have to show
that ¹ : T ! ∆(A), where ¹(a j t) = º¤(a j MiniY R(t);t), induces a truthful and
obedient one-period R¤–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcome (an outcome in E#(R¤)),
i.e., that Equation (2) on page 14 is satisﬁed for all t0
i 2 R¤(ti) and di : Ai ! Ai.
Since t0
i 2 R¤(ti) , MiniY R
i (t0
i) 2 e Y R
i (ti), this condition is implied by the fact
that º¤ is a e Y R–certiﬁcation equilibrium outcome (see Equation (1) on page 9 with
Y = Y = e Y R). ¤
Proof of Theorem 2. Let R be a proﬁle of reporting correspondences satisfying
MCC. By Lemma 4 we have E(R j K = 1) µ E¤(Y
R), and by Lemma 2 we have
E¤(Y
R) µ E(R j K = 1), so E¤(Y
R) = E(R j K = 1). Thus, by Theorem 1 we get
E(R) = E(R j K = 1). ¤
Proof of Theorem 3. We have E(R) = E¤(Y
R) by Theorem 1, E¤(Y
R) µ E¤(e Y R)
because players have less possible deviations in a canonical e Y R–certiﬁcation equi-
librium than in a canonical Y
R–certiﬁcation equilibrium, and E¤(e Y R) = E#(R¤) by
Lemma 5. Consequently, E(R) µ E#(R¤). ¤
References
Alger, I. and C.-t. A. Ma (2003): “Moral Hazard, Insurance, and some Collu-
sion,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 50, 225–247.
Alger, I. and R. Renault (2002): “Screening Ethics when Honest Agents Care
about Fairness,” mimeo.
Aumann, R. J. (1974): “Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1, 67–96.
Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart (2003): “Long Cheap Talk,” Econometrica, forth-
coming.
Baliga, S. and S. Morris (2002): “Co-ordination, Spillovers, and Cheap Talk,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 105, 450–468.
B ar any, I. (1992): “Fair Distribution Protocols or How the Players Replace For-
tune,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 17, 327–340.
Ben-Porath, E. (2003): “Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 108, 45–71.
Bull, J. and J. Watson (2002): “Hard Evidence and Mechanism Design,” mimeo,
University of California, San Diego.
Che, Y.-K. and I. Gale (2000): “The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget-
Constrained Buyer,” Journal of Economic Theory, 92, 198–233.
Crawford, V. P. and J. Sobel (1982): “Strategic Information Transmission,”
Econometrica, 50, 1431–1451.
18d'Aspremont, C., S. Bhattacharya, and L.-A. G erard-Varet (2000): “Bar-
gaining and Sharing Innovative Knowledge,” Review of Economic Studies, 67,
255–271.
Deneckere, R. and S. Severinov (2001): “Mechanism Design and Communica-
tion Costs,” mimeo, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Farrell, J. and M. Rabin (1996): “Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic Perspec-
tives, 10, 103–118.
Forges, F. (1986): “An Approach to Communication Equilibria,” Econometrica,
54, 1375–1385.
——— (1988): “Can Sunspots Replace a Mediator?” Journal of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, 17, 347–368.
——— (1990): “Universal Mechanisms,” Econometrica, 58, 1341–1364.
Forges, F., J.-F. Mertens, and R. Vohra (2002): “The Ex Ante Incentive
Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Eﬀects,” Econometrica, 70, 1865–1892.
Gerardi, D. (2003): “Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and
Incomplete Information,” Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Glazer, J. and A. Rubinstein (2001): “Debates and Decisions: On a Rationale
of Argumentation Rules,” Games and Economic Behavior, 36, 158–173.
Green, J. R. and J.-J. Laffont (1986): “Partially Veriﬁable Information and
Mechanism Design,” Review of Economic Studies, 53, 447–456.
Grossman, S. J. (1981): “The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Dis-
closure about Product Quality,” Journal of Law and Economics, 24, 461–483.
Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1980): “Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids,”
Journal of Finance, 35, 323–334.
Koessler, F. (2002): “Strategic Knowledge Sharing in Bayesian Games,” mimeo,
THEMA, Universit´ e de Cergy-Pontoise.
——— (2003): “Persuasion Games with Higher-Order Uncertainty,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, forthcoming.
Krishna, V. and J. Morgan (2002): “The Art of Conversation,” mimeo.
Lipman, B. L. and D. Seppi (1995): “Robust Inference in Communication Games
with Partial Provability,” Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 370–405.
Milgrom, P. (1981): “Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and
Applications,” Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380–391.
Myerson, R. B. (1982): “Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized
Principal-Agent Problems,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 67–81.
19——— (1986): “Multistage Games with Communication,” Econometrica, 54, 323–
358.
——— (1994): “Communication, Correlated Equilibria and Incentive Compatibil-
ity,” in Handbook of Game Theory, ed. by R. J. Aumann and S. Hart, Elsevier
Science B. V., vol. 2, chap. 24, 827–847.
Okuno-Fujiwara, A., M. Postlewaite, and K. Suzumura (1990): “Strategic
Information Revelation,” Review of Economic Studies, 57, 25–47.
Seidmann, D. J. and E. Winter (1997): “Strategic Information Transmission
with Veriﬁable Messages,” Econometrica, 65, 163–169.
Shin, H. S. (1994): “The Burden of Proof in a Game of Persuasion,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 64, 253–264.
——— (2003): “Disclosures and Asset Returns,” Econometrica, 71, 105–133.
Urbano, A. and J. E. Vila (2002): “Computational Complexity and Communi-
cation: Coordination in Two-Player Games,” Econometrica, 70, 1893–1927.
Verrecchia, R. E. (2001): “Essays on Disclosure,” Journal of Accounting and
Economics, 32, 97–180.
Wolinsky, A. (2003): “Information Transmission when the Sender’s Preferences
are Uncertain,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming.
20